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THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF AFGHAN WOMEN:
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN ISLAMIC LAW AND
MUSLIM CULTURE
KATHRYN J. WEBBER*
At the military hospital in the heart of the capital, Afghan-
istan's top surgeon [a general in the Afghan army] wrapped
herself in a large shawl and hid in a back room to have a
cigarette with four colleagues.
When the door opened, she jumped, quickly put out the
cigarette and buried herselffurther inside the shawl, afraid the
intruder was one of the Islamic Taliban soldiers who overran
the capital only days earlier.
But it was a reporter. After confirming the new Taliban
rulers had granted permission for her to be interviewed, the
doctor arranged to meet the reporter the next morning. She
smiled, shook hands and said goodbye.
But the next day, seven unsmiling Taliban fighters, rifles
slung over their shoulders, blocked the door to her office.
"She's gone," said one. They didn't know where, but they
knew she had been replaced - by a man.1
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1995,
Tufts University. I am honored to receive the Samuel F. Pryor III Prize for
the Most Distingi'shed Comment. This comment is dedicated to my parents,
Edward and Judith Webber, for their unquestioning support of my education,
and to Jeremy Pitcock for his love an[ encouragement. Special thanks to
Melissa Choi and Carrie Corcoran for their assistance with this piece.
' Kathy Gannon, More Fear of Islamic Rules than Barrage of Missiles,
EDMONTON J., Oct. 6, 1996, at El0.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On September 27, 1996, the Taliban, a militant Islamic group,
seized control of Afghanistan's capital.2 Comprised of Islamic
clerics and students,3 the Taliban established a new fundamentalist
Islamic government over two-thirds of Afghanistan. Initially, the
Afghan population welcomed the Taliban regime, hoping the new
government would bring peace' to this war-torn area.6 The
2 See John F. Burns, Kabul's Islamic Rulers Face Rivals' Guns and Growing
Popular Discontent, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1996, at A14.
3 The Taliban name means "religious students" in Arabic. See John F.
Burns, Afghan Professionals Fleeing Rule by Clerics, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 7, 1996,
at AS. In addition, the Taliban have roots in Muslim religious schools
established for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. See Islamic Rebels Pursue Retreating
Afghan Army, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1996, at A14. Mullah Muhammad Omar,
leader of the Taliban, is an Islamic cleric who sees himself as the "king of all
Muslims." Jon Swain, Kabul Hushed by Taliban Dark Age, SUNDAY TIMEs, Oct.
6, 1996, at 17.
4 See John F. Burns, In A Stalemate, Afghan Foes Reload, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
24, 1997, at 16. A coalition, known as the Northern Alliance, see John F.
Burns, As Foes Splinter, Afghan Islamic Victors Press On, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1997, at 3, controls the nothern third of Afghanistan, see Plane Crash Kills Foes
of Afghan Rulers, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1997, at A5. The Taliban and
Northern Alliance continue to fight. See Burns, supra. In May 1997, the
Taliban advanced all the way to Mazar-i-Sharif, the principal stronghold of the
Northern Alliance, but the Alliance pushed the Taliban back to their initial
position when they first took over Kabul. See id.
5 See, e.g., Islamic Rebels Pursue Retreating Afghan Army, supra note 3, at
A14 ("Some residents welcomed the Taliban, hoping for an end to factional
fighting."); Anthony Loyd, Taleban's Rough Justice Wins Approval from Crime-
plagued Kabul Citizens, TIMES (London, Nov. 13, 1996, at 14 (noting that
citizens "welcomed [the] Taleban's stan on law and the new security it offers
for their lives")
6 Afghanistan has a long history of conflict, first by rebels trying to depose
communist rule and then among the various tribal factions trying to gain
control of the country. See John-Thor Dahlburg, Cold War Incursion Sowed
Seeds of Terror, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 4, 1996, at Al. In 1978, after a left-wing
revolution against the Daoud republic, a pro-Soviet Marxist regime was
installed. See id. at A17. In 1979, the new ruler, Hafizullah Amin, imposed
"rigorous and unpopular Communist policies, resulting in an... uprising that
leads to a massive military intervention by the Soviet Union.. .. " Id. This
civil war lasted until 1989, with the United States supporting the resistance and
the Soviet Union supporting the Communist government. See id. In 1989,
Soviet troops withdrew, and fighting continued between the old Communist
government and the resistance. See id. In 1992, the old Communist regime
stepped down. See id. Four years of factional warfare among the various
Afghan tribes followed, and the fighting continues between the Taliban and the
alliance of the northern provinces.
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fundamentalist regime, however, would soon bring drastic change
to the Afghan society and economy!7 This Comment examines
the Taliban's economic effects on women.
Women particularly face a darker side of Taliban rule. For
example, one of the Taliban's first actions was to ban women
from all employment! Moreover, two women were beaten in
the street for not wearing proper Islamic dress.9 Understanding
the full effect of Taliban's rule on women, however, requires a
deeper analysis than a mere listing of current abuses. It requires
an examination of Islamic law.
The Taliban government has promised that the laws of Islam
will be the laws of the state.'0 Islamic law, or Shari'a, affects
7 See CBS Evening News: Taliban Rulers Impose Strict Islamic Law on
Women (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 10, 1996); Morning Edition: Rebel
Islamic Group Captures Capital of Af hanistan (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 30,
1996) [hereinafter Morning Edition: Islamic Group. Upon gaining control of the
capital, the Taliban hung the former leader in public. See Islamic Rebels Pursue
Retreating Afghan Army, supra note 3, at 14 (noting that the Soviet Era leader
was left "hanging by wire nooses outside the presidential palace"). The Taliban
also forbade men from trimming their beards for 45 days; banned canaries
because they sing, outlawed card games and chess because they encourage
gambling; banned soccer as un-Islamic; and beat a married couple who were
riding too closely together on their bicycles. See Christopher Thomas, Divine
Rulers Free Canaries and Ban Chess, TIMES (London), Oct. 8, 1996, at 11. The
Taliban closed movie theaters, burned films, cut music cassettes, destroyed
bottles of liquor, and forced all men to pray in the mosques. See 60 Minutes:
Profile: Taliban (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 3, 1996) [hereinafter 60 Minutes:
Taliban].
s See John F. Burns, New Afghan Rulers Impose Harsh Mores of the Islamic
Code, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1996, at Al, Christopher Thomas, Militants Bring
A Veil Down On Battered Kabul, TIMES (Londoi), Sept. 30, 1996, at 11. The
Taliban have not hestitated to enforce the full extent of their laws. See, e.g.,
Swain, supra note 3, at 17 (noting that a "widow was prevented ... from
burying her dead husband because [women were] forbidden to work").
' See Thomas, supra note 8, at 11 (noting that women were beaten for
wearing "un-Islamic" dress).
10 The Deputy Foreign Minister of the government, Sher Mohammed
Stanakzai, has stated, "Afghanistan is an Islamic state, and our rules and
regulations will be ... Islamic rules .... [W]hatever is in Islam... will be
implemented [by the Taliban]. We will be strict with that." 60 Minutes:
Taliban, supra note 7. Mullah Mohammed Hassan, one of the most powerful
clerics in the Taliban, has stated, "'We take our lead from our Holy Prophet
... and whatever it [Islam] prohibits, we prohibit.'" See John F. Burns, With
Sugared Tea and Caustic Rules, An Afghan Leader Exelains Himself, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 1996, at 9. The Afghan new agency in Pakistan "declared that
Afghanistan was now a 'completely Islamic state' where a 'complete Islamic
system will be enforced.'" Christopher Thomas, Swift Revenge as Taleban Seizes
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women in unique ways. The Shari'a has detailed rules concerning
women's inheritance rights, dower rights, and marriage duties.
These rules have specific economic consequences for Afghan
women. Therefore, to understand the economic effects of the
Taliban government on women, one must understand the
economic effects of Islamic law.
This analysis does not, however, automatically conclude that
Islam is anti-woman.1 Some of the technical Islamic laws,
particularly the laws based on the Quaran itself, actually grant
women specific rights to economic resources. At the same time,
the laws of marriage, based more on jurisprudential tradition than
on the Quran itself, can limit women's ability to earn income
through employment.
The real culprits in the economic oppression of women,
however, are social norms and customs. 12 More than the techni-
cal Islamic law itself, these social realities limit Afghan women's
economic opportunities. 3 Studies of women in the Muslim
communities of Egypt, Israel, and the West Bank reveal that the
patriarchal norms of society are the strongest forces that limit
women's access to wealth. Thus, to understand the economic
future of Afghan women, one must understand the interaction of
social norms and Islamic law. This understanding supports the
claim of many Islamic feminists that a rejection of the oppression
Control of Kabul, TIMES (London), Sept. 28, 1996, at 11. See also Afghanistan's
Agony, TIMES (London), Oct. 1, 1996, at 17 (noting that the Taliban have
imposed Sharia law); John F. Burns, New Afghan Rulers Shock Even Their
Backers in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1996, at A3 (noting that the Taliban
is imposing the Islamic laws); Jon Swain, Terror Chief Found Behind Taliban
Lines, TIMES (London), Oct. 27, 1996, at 19 ("The [Taliban] movement swept
through the country imposing harsh sharia law .... ").
11 See Leila P. Sayeh & Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the Treatment of
Women, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 311, 312 (1995) ("Islam has often been named as the
main factor inhibiting the development of women's rights in Muslim
countries.")
12 See id. (noting that commentators often mistakenly blame Islam itself,
and not the "misinterpretation of Sbari ab law perpetuated by patriarchal
societies," as the real cause of women's oppression) (footnote omitted).
13 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, in her study of Islamic human rights theories, also
makes this distinction between the Islamic law itself and its interpretation. See
ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS xii (2d ed. 1995). She
argues that in order to understand Islamic views of human rights, one must
look at the extrapolation of rules and policies from Islamic law and not "the
core doctrines of Islam." Id.
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of women does not necessarily involve a rejection of Islam.14
This Comment argues that social norms, more so than the
technical Islamic law, limit Afghan women's access to economic
resources. Subsequently, this Comment predicts the economic
future of Afghan women by analyzing both Islamic law and
Muslim society. First, Sections 1.1 and 1.2 present the relevance
of Afghanistan's experience to other international issues. Having
established the Taliban's importance in the international realm,
Sections 2 and 3 examine the internal forces in Afghanistan that
affect women economically.
Section 2 analyzes the Islamic laws on inheritance, dower, and
marriage. Section 2 determines that Islamic law grants women
rights to certain types of wealth. Section 3 then examines the
social norms that limit the economic rights to inheritance, dower,
and marriage found in Islamic law. An analysis of studies from
other Islamic communities shows how social forces shape the
reality of Muslim women's legal rights and predicts the economic
future of Afghanistan. Thus, Section 3 contends that social norms
acting upon inheritance, dower, and marriage, and not the
definition of these legal rights, limit Afghan women's access to
economic resources. Section 4 then suggests a methodology for
improving the economic status of Afghan women. This Section
shows that any reform must come from a new interpretation of
Islamic law, rather than a total rejection of Islamic jurisprudence.
1.1. Afghanistan's Stability Is an Important International Issue
The effect of Islamic rule on Afghanistan is especially relevant
to current international issues. First, the unstable situation in
Afghanistan is of immediate significance to the international
community. The Taliban continue to fight against an alliance of
14 See Morning Edition: Muslim Women Gather to Discuss Responses to
Militants (NPR radio broadcast, May 13, 1996) (noting that Buthena Sihbahn,
a professor in Syria, feels that the problem of findamentalism is its misinterpre-
tation of the basic tenets of Islam); see also Weekend Edition: Muslim Feminist
Comments on Women in Islam (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 20, 1994) (noting
that Dr. Mahnaz Afkhami, executive director of the Sisterhood is Global
Institute, stated that the essence of Islam is egalitarian, whereas anti-feminism
comes from society). See generally GERALDINE BROOKS, NINE PARTS OF
DESIRE (1995) (arguing that Islam essentially carries a liberating message for
women, but that cultural practices have distorted this message).
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the more moderate northern provinces."5 India, Iran, and Russia
support the northern government,16 whereas Pakistan supports
the Taliban.17  The United Nations ("UN") has expressed
concern over the continued fighting and human rights abuses in
the country." On December 17, 1996, the UN passed a resolu-
tion calling for all Afghan parties to meet with UN representa-
tives in an attempt to restore peace. 9 In addition to the prob-
lems caused by the continual war, Afghanistan's condition raises
issues of international aid,2" the spread of Islamic fundamental-
15 See supra note 4; see also John F. Burns, As Foes Splinter, Afghan Islamic
Victors Press On, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1997, at 3 (noting that the Northern
Alliance gives women far more freedom than the Taliban).
16 See John F. Burns, Afghan Fights Islamic Tide, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1996,
at Al.
1 See John F. Burns & Steve LeVine, How Afghans' Stern Rulers Took Hold,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1996, at Al; David Rieft, In Afghanistan, a Dangerous
Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1997, at 23.
18 See UN General Assembly Concerned Over Human Rights Abuses, (BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 20, 1996).
19 See id. The United Nations also faces the controversy over the Taliban's
request to be given Afghanistan's seat in the General Assembly.
20 Afghanistan is very weak economically and the civil war between Islamic
rebels and the Soviets led to further economic and civil destruction. Afghani-
stan is one of the poorest nations in the world. See Dalhburg, supra note 6.
Most of its roads were damaged during the civil war and it has almost no rail-
ways. See id. It has one of the lowest life expectancies and the highest infant
mortality rates in the world. See id.
Afghanistan will continue to need international aid, but the Taliban's
policies on women interfere with the willingness and ability of aid organiza-
tions to bring economic support to Afghanistan. The United Nations
suspended its aid programs on Novemeber 21, 1996 because the safety of the
aid workers could-not be guaranteed. See Workers Freed U.N. Resumes Afghan
Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at A8 (noting that the U.N. resumed aid when
the Taliban released four aid workers who had been arrested). Two French aid
workers were arrested for sitting with Afghan women at a luncheon. See
Afghans to Prosecute French Aid Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb., 27, 1996 at A16.
Some aid programs have been suspended because female aid workers have been
forced to stay home. See John F. Burns, Afghan Professionals Fleeing Rule by
Clerics, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 7, 1996, at A8; see also Women and Islam, TIMES
(London), Oct. 9, 1996, at 19 (noting that women are forbidden to work); in a
note 24 (noting the particular problems continuing international aid in the face
of the Taliban's harsh polcies on women).
The Taliban has indicated that withdrawing international aid will not affect
their policies. See Burns, supra note 10, at 9 noting that according to one of
the Tiliban's leaders, the Taliban council has agreed to limit its use of Western
aid to avoid giving other countries financial leverage over Taliban policies).
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ism,21 the supply of heroin world-wide,2 and international terrorism.'
21 Understanding the Taliban in Afghanistan helps in understanding the
implications of the continual spread of Islamic fundamentalism. The spread of
Islamic fundamentalism and its consequences are pressing current issues. -Islam
has also re-emerged in Muslim politics. Islam is used by governments to
legitimate their rule and policies, and it also serves as an umbrella for
opposition forces who seek to topple 'un-Islamic governments.'" JOHN L.
ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW ix (1982); see also Urfan Kahliq,
Beyond the Veil?: An Analysis of the Provisions of the Women's Convention and
the Law as Stipulated in Shari'ah, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1995) (noting that
Islam is experiencing a resurgence in many countries). Even the traditionally
secular Turkey has faced a resurgence of Islamic Fundamentalism. See Morning
Edition: Kemalists Try to Counter Rise in Islamic Fundamentalism (NPR radio
broadcast, July 22, 1996).
The intifada in Gaza and the West Bank and the unrest in Kasmir, see
Federal News Service, Joint Press Conference with President Bill Clinton and
Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Apr. 11, 1995, have revealed how
Islam can be a significant force in political movements.
Thus, "[f]ear of the Taliban's fundamentalism has reached beyond
Afghanistan's borders." Burns, supra note 3, at A8; see also Rieff, supra note 17,
at 23 (noting that an Islamic government in Afghanistan would facilitate the
further spread of fundamentalism in Uzbekistan).
' Afghanistan is currently the supplier of almost half of the world's
heroin. See Michael Dynes, Holy Army olsters Heroin Trade, TIMES (London),
Oct. 2, 1996, at 9. Despite the Taliban's opposition to heroin use by Afghans,
it profits from taxing drugs sent abroad. See John F. Burns, Afghanistan Reels
Back Into View, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1996, at 5; see also Dynes supra (noting
that the Taliban levy a 10% tax on the heroin crop).
' Many Muslim fundamentalists who fought in the Afghan wars have
transformed their ideological and military experience into terrorist action. See
Congressional Testimony Document Clearing House, D. Khalid Duran
testifying on the Situation in Afghanistan, Apr. 16, 1996. "Transnational
groups comprised of fanatical Islamic extremists ... who fought in Afghanistan
... now drift to other countries with the aim of establishing anti-western,
fundamentalist regimes by destabilizing traditional governments and attacking
U.S. and Western targets." Dahlburg, supra note 6, at A16. For example, the
terrorists who bombed the United States Military base in Saudi Arabia had
fought in the Afghan war. See id. The State Department reports that almost
all Afghan factions are still involved in training terrorists. See id. Saudi Islamic
militant Osama Bin Laden, a suspected organizer and financier of terrorist acts
(specifically the Saudi Arabia bombing), lives in Afghanistan and is "an
honoured guest in Kabul." Swain, supra note 10, at 19.
These implications for international terrorism do not end with the
establishment of one rule over a major part of the country. Afghanistan does
more than offer a military context in which terrorists can be trained. It ives
the ideological underpinnings for an aggressive jihad, and is spreading jihad
enthusiasm to other countries. See Dalhburg, supra note 6.
The Taliban's clerics support the notion of jihad that entails overthrowing
non-Muslim states through force. See id. For example, one Taliban member
stated, "'When we have conquered Afghanistan, we will conquer the whole
world for Islam.'" Tim McGirk, Taliban Zealots Determined to Enforce A Strict
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1.2. The Economic Situation of Afghan Women Is Relevant to
International Human Rights Efforts
Islam's effect on Afghan women presents an important
international issue.24 In response to the Taliban's repressive
actions, an international group of Muslim women has published
a manual on the rights of women under Islam.2 The Taliban
has admitted that the "treatment of women in Afghanistan is a
stumbling block to better relations . . . [with] the West." 26  In
addition, the experience of women in Afghanistan is relevant to
the ongoing debate over the compatibility of Islam and interna-
tional human rights agreements.' The recent United Nations
Conference on Women has highlighted the problem of applying
Vuion of Islam, VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 28, 1996, at A10 (quoting a member
of the Taliban).
24 The economic impact of Islamic rule upon women is a current issue in
many other countries.
Because of the resurgence of Islamic movements, the position of
women living under Islamic laws has become of increasing importance
in recent years.. . . [Tihis "re-awakening" of religious identity has led
to a surge in the "Islamisation" of domestic laws in countries such as
Iran, Egypt, Sudan, Malaysia and Pakistan, and a corresponding decline
in the fortunes of women living under these regimes.
Khaliq, supra note 21, at 3.
The impact of the Taliban on Afghan women's economic position is also
relevant to international aid programs. First, banning women from work
promises to place more Afghan families into pover an increases the need for
aid. See, e.g., CBS Evening News (GBS television broadcast, Oct. 10, 1996)
(noting the large number of war widows who were the sole family providers
until the Taliban banned women from work); Swain, supra note 3 (noting that
tens of thousands of families who were dependent upon the income of their
female relatives have been put on the breadline). At ihe same time, a number
of agencies are leaving Afghanistan because of its oppressive policies toward
women. See, e.g., Christopher Thomas, Crackdown on Women's Rights Leaves
Aid Agencies Split on Kabul Pullout, TIMES (London), Oct. 31, 1996, at 15
(noting Oxfam suspended its operations in Kabul because women were banned
from working).
25 See Barbara Crossette, A Manual on Rights of Women Under Islam, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1996, at A4.
26 Terence White, Taliban Acknowledge Afghan Women's Issues Stumbling
Block with West, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 22, 1996.
' See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 13; Hilary Charlesworth et al., Resolving
Conflicting Human Rights Standards in International Law, 85 AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 336 (1991); Surya Prakash Sinha, TheAxiology of the International Bill
of Human Rights, 1 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 21 (1989); Ann Elizabeth Mayer,
Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307 (1994).
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International Women's Rights conventions to the particular
situation of Islamic women." Thus, an examination of the
economic effects of the Taliban rule on women offers relevant
information for understanding both the impact of Islamic
fundamentalism and the problems fundamentalism causes for
international women's issues.
2. THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF ISLAMIC LAW ON AFGHAN
WOMEN: INHERITANCE, DOWER, AND MARRIAGE
The economic effect of Taliban rule initially seems obvious.
Before the Taliban came to power, women were a significant part
of the workforce.29 The Taliban's rule banning women from
work denies women access to wages, a crucial means of sup-
port.3" The challenge in understanding the economic reality of
Afghan women is to understand how Islamic law, as distinct from
cultural norms, contributes to their plight.
A common Western response to the economic oppression of
women in Muslim countries is to blame the Islamic religion.3'
28 See Weekend Edition: Meaning of Documents at Women's Conference in
Beijing (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 16, 1995); Morning Edition: Women in
Beijing Debate Religion and Freedom of Choice (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 11,
1995); Khaliq, supra note 21.
" "Kabul's women had been allowed to work for 50 years, and without
women the city could not function. The civil service, hospitals and schools
depended on them." Christopher Thomas, Crackdown on Women's Rights
Leaves Aid Agencies Split on Kabul Pullout, TIMES (London), Oct. 31, 1996, at
15; see also Bernard Levin, Taleban Meets Caliban, TIMES (London), Oct. 18,
1996, at 22 (noting that approximately 250,000 women were working before the
Taleban arrived); Jon Swain, Kabul Hushed by Taliban Dark Age, TIMES
(London), Oct. 6, 1996, at 17 (noting that hospitals in Afghanistan are
paralyzed because many of the doctors were women). In Kabul, one woman
doctor pleaded with the Taliban members on the street, asking them to let herwork because she had three patients to operat on. See Swain, supra. The
schools [in Kabul] closed, beacuse all the teachers were women." ChristopherThomas, Kabul Traffic Cops Under-Employed in City of Disruption, TIM4ES
(London), Oct. 19, 1996, at 16.
3w The Taliban bar on women's employment will further impoverish the
already struggling population of Afghan women. See, e.g., CBS Evening News
(CBS television broadhcast, Oct. 10, 1996) (notin the Iare number of war
widows who were the sole providers for their famifies until the Taliban banned
women from work); Swain, supra note 29, at 17 (noting that tens of thousands
of families who were dependent upon the income of their female relatives have
been put on the bread line).
3 See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 11, at 312.
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Islam does have specific laws that affect women economically.32
An analysis of these laws, rather than a reliance on stereotypes, is
necessary to know whether Islam and its law deserve this blame.
This section examines the Islamic laws on inheritance, dower, and
marriage in order to show that the technical Islamic law is not the
main factor limiting Afghan women's wealth. Rather, some
Islamic laws actually give women specific rights to economic
resources.
2.1. The Legal Impact of the Islamic Religion
An analysis of the economic position of Afghan women
necessarily involves an examination of the tenets of Islam. An
understanding of Islamic law is necessary, not simply because
Islamic clerics formed the Taliban government, but because Islam's
effect on Afghanistan goes beyond shaping the government's
philosophy. The Islamic religion of the Taliban provides many
of the specific laws of the state. 3 In Islam, religion governs
politics, economics, and law.34 "A striking element in the
cultural configurations that are grounded in Islam is the primary
place that law has within them."35  The Shari'a (slamic Law)
generally, and the Quran (the Holy Book) specifically, offer
detailed rules of a legal nature.36 These rules are more than
32 See discussion infra Parts 2.1.1-2.1.3, 2.2.
33 See Khaliq, supra note 21, at 7 (noting that in addition to being the
source of religious norms, Islam is the source of legal principles and rules for
Muslims.
Modern Islamic countries have not rejected the Quran and Shari'a as the
basic framework for an Islamic community. For example, both the Iranian and
Pakistani constitutions specifically state that all laws must conform to the
dictates of the Quran. See AYATOLLAH YAHYA NOORI, LEGAL AND
POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF AN ISLAMIC STATE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAN
AND PAKISTAN 108 (1987) (Appendix 3, Extracts from the Pakistani Constitu-
tion). All evidence shows the new Taliban state will also use the Quran to
structure its laws. See supra note 10.
' See NOORI, supra note 33, at 68. The structural effects of Islam are very
different from Western concepts of government. For a Muslim state, religion
is not separated from government interference; it is the foundation for the
government itself. See id.
" Daisy Hilse Dwyer, Law and Islam in the Middle East. An Introduction,
in LAW AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1, 1 (Daisy Hilse Dwyer ed., 1990).
36 ESPOSrTO, supra note 21, at 3. The Quran has detailed rules for criminal
punishment, marriage and divorce, custody and legitimacy of children,
inheritance, dower, adoption, and slavery. See generally IMETIYAZ HUSSAIN,
MUSLIM LAW AND CUSTOMS (1989) (describing in detail the various laws of the
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theological concepts; they offer a comprehensive framework for
a community, including its legal provisions. 7 Thus, becoming
a Muslim state has meant implementing the Shari'a and the
Quran's specific laws.
All Muslim states with governments similar to the conservative
Taliban rule have instituted the laws of the Quran and Shari'a as
the official law.3" For example, when Pakistan was formed as a
Muslim state it incorporated the Quranic laws of succession,
dower, and polygamy.39 Even non-Muslim states sometimes have
special Islamic courts that apply Quranic laws to its Muslim
citizens.40 Thus, as Sher Mohammed Stanakzai, Deputy Foreign
Minister of the Taliban government, has stated, "Afghanistan is an
Islamic state, and our rules and regulations will be according to
Islamic rules. I mean to say, whatever is in Islam... that will be
implemented. We will be strict with that."41
This implementation of Islamic law is especially relevant for
Quran and Shari'a).
37 Dwyer, supra note 35, at 1. The impact of Islam on the structure of a
state can be seen in Pakistan, where religious courts were created as part of the
judicial arm of the government. NOORI, supra note 33, at 106. These courts
have the power to nullify secular laws that do not conform to Islam. Id. at
107.
Thus, Islam clearly has an effect on the entire society. See Audrey
Chapman Smock & Nadia Haggag Youssef, Egypt From Seclusion to Limited
Participation, in WOMEN: ROLES AND STATUS iN EIGHT COUNTRIES 33, 37
(Janet Z. Giele & Audrey C. Smock eds., 1977) ("Islam, as an integral religion,
formulates a total pattern of living rather than focusing primarily on
theology."); ROBERT ROBERTS, THE SOcIAL LAws OF THE QORAN 2 (2d ed.
1971) noting that Muhammed, in addition to founding a religion, was also a
social reformer as well). The impact of Islam on community structure can be
seen in its early history. Islam changed the tribal practices of the early Arabian
communities, often in very significant ways. See ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at
4 (noting that Islam changed the social customs of Arabian communities). See
also AHARON LAYISH, WOMEN AND ISLAMIC LAW IN A NoN-MUSLIM STATE
279 (1975). For example, pre-Islamic Arabian tribes denied women all rights
to any inheritance. The Quran, in contrast, gave women specific shares of
their relatives' estates. See ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 5. The Quran also, to
some extent, changed marriage from the sale of women to a contract where
women, at least technically, were legal partners. See id. at 4.
31 See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 11.
39 See ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 81-88 (noting the various modern reforms
in Pakistan were necessary because the traditional Quranic laws were in place).
4 See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 2 (noting that special Islamic courts in
Israel have exclusive jurisdiction over personal status and waqf (religious
endowment) issues for Muslims).
41 See 60 Minutes, supra note 7.
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women because many Quranic and Shari'a laws address women in
particular.42 These rules do not solely dictate women's theologi-
cal or social position; they also significantly affect their economic
position.43  By granting specific inheritance rights," dower
rights,4' and maintenance rights in marriage," the Quran and
Shari'a dictate the distribution of property within a Muslim
community. Therefore, an analysis of the economic effects of an
Islamic rule on women should begin with the Shari'a.
2.2. Inheritance
Islamic law, also known as the Shari'a, is comprised of four
sources: the Quran (the Holy Book), the Sunna (the model
behavior of the Prophet), qiyas (analogic reasoning), and ijma' (the
consensus of the community)4 . This section examines inheri-
tance an aspects of the Shari'a based on the Quran, the strongest
and most immutable source of law.48
The Quran provides detailed rules governing inheritance.
Certain relatives in an extended family receive a specified share in
a decedent's estate.49 Overall, female relatives get approximately
one-half of what their male counterparts receive.50 For example,
42 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 37 (noting that Mohammed was
particularly concerned with the position of women); MAYER, supra note 13, at
110 (noting that the Quran devotes considerable attention to the status of
women); EsPOSrTo, supra note 21, at 4 (noting that some of the most important
changes Islam brought to society came from the Quranic passages on women).
The Quran gives specific rules for women in dower, marriage and divorce,
inheritance, the iddat, maintenance, and custody. See generally JAMALJ. NASIR,
THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW (1990) (describing the various
Shari'a laws that affect women).
43 See, e.g., Smock & Youseff, supra note 38, at 37 (noting that Mohammed
gave women property rights).
4See ANNELIES MOORS, WOMEN, PROPERTY AND ISLAM: PALESTINIAN
EXPERIENCES, 1920-1990, 50-51 (1995).
41 See id. at 43.
" See NASIR, supra note 43, at 60.
47 See Dywer, supra note 35, at 2; R.S. SHARMA & NAREHESH KUMAR
MAHESHWARI, KEY TO MUSLIM LAw 1 (1988).
48 See ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 3; Khaliq, supra note 21 at 6.
49 See MOORS, supra note 45, at 50-51.
50 See ROBERTS, supra note 38, at 66; Khaliq, supra note 21, at 14 (noting
that women suffer discrimination in Islamic inheritance law in many ways);
Behind the Chador, ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1997, at S9 ("Women, worth less than
men under Islamic law, do not get equal rights to ... inheritance."); Muharyani
Othman, Syariab Court Comes Under Fire, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996,
[Vol. 18:31060
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss3/4
AFGHAN WOMEN
if a couple have children, a husband will inherit one-quarter of his
wife's estate, whereas a wife will only inherit one-eighth of her
husband's estate.5 ' The father of a decedent will often inherit
more than a wife.5" Moreover, a son, as the most favored heir
of the decedent, inherits twice as much as a daughter.53
Thus, women generally inherit less than men do under Islamic
law. They do, however, inherit at least a specific amount that a
will usually cannot override5 4 Thus, the Islamic law of inheri-
tance affects women economically by guaranteeing female relatives
a certain amount of property through inheritance. The positive
effect of inheritance law on women is that they receive property
to use in the economic system. Compared to men, however,
women are at an economic disadvantage under the inheritance
law. Thus, the Shari'a grants a woman economic resources, but
diminishes her financial position by giving other economic actors,
namely men, more.
at 6 (noting that in Malaysia, under Islamic law, men are given a larger share
of property inheritance).
51 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 446-447. If the couple had no children
the husband gets a one-half share whereas the wife receives one-quarter. See id.
'2 See id. (noting that the father receives a one-sixth share under certain
circumstances).
" See id. at 450; Can Muslim Women Thrive Under the Veil? Swiss REV. OF
WORLD AFF., Oct. 1, 1996 ("According to Islamic canon, a daughter's share of
an inheritance should be smaller than a son's."); Roula Khalaf, How to be an
Iranian Islamic Feminist, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 21, 1996, at 6 ("[A] daughter
receives half her brother's inheritance.").
The grandmother and grandfather both receive one-sixth shares, but the
paternal grandmother only inherits if there is no father or mother. The
paternal grandfather inherits if there is no father. Both the son's daughter and
the full sister inherit only in the absence of a male counterpart. See HUSSAIN,
supra note 36, at 44647.
54 See id. at 26. "[A] man is not free to bequeath his whole estate to
whomever he chooses. He is obligated by law to give certain fixed amounts to
specific heirs. These shares represent the inviolate right of such heirs to an
inheritance." ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 45.
The Quran is silent as to the extent of a continued power of testamentary
disposition. See id. However, Islamic clerics have found in the Sunnah (the
stories of the prophet's life) that a person can bequeath up to one-third of his
estate to parties of his own choice as long as they are not his legal heirs. See
id. Afghan Muslims follow the Hanafi sect of Islam. Under Hanafi law, to
grant anything above this allowable one-third, the heirs must give their
permission. See id.
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2.3. Dower
Dower law probably offers the most positive economic rules
for women under the specific dictates of the Quran. In a study
of Palestinian women living in the West Bank, Annelies Moors
concluded that dower is still the major medium through which
women gain access to property.5 Despite some legal limitations,
the Quran gives women genuine property rights through dow-
er.5
6
The Quran dictates that a woman should receive dower as a
free gift upon her marriage. 7 Dower is a gift of either money
or property that a man must give his bride upon the marriage
contract's enactment.58  The purpose of dower is not consider-
ation for the sale of a wife. Rather, dower may be a "mark of
respect for the wife."5 9 In addition to being a symbol of respect,
dower may also be an important property right for a woman,
balancing other rights given to the husband.6°
A woman is the exclusive owner of her dower.61 She can
dispose of the money or asset as she chooses, without her
husband's permission. 62 A woman cannot return the dower to
her husband unless she is sane and gives her free consent.63 In
addition, a marriage cannot be conditional upon the waiver of
dower." Most dower is payable to a wife upon demand.
65
Unlike maintenance, discussed later, the dower right is enforceable
in many ways. It is legally enforceable in the courts; or the wife
legally can take possession of her husband's estate until he pays
her dower.66 In addition, if a man does not pay his wife dower,
5' See MOORS, supra note 45, at 124
56 See The Limits of Freedom in the Kuwaiti Hothouse, SWISS REV. OF
WORLD AFF., Jan. 3, 1997 (noting that Islam gives women property rights).
57 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 43.
58 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 220.
s Sayeh & Morse, supra note 11, at 325.
60 See id. at 220
61 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 47; MOORS, supra note 45, at 86.
62 See MOORS, supra note 45, at 86.
63 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 226.
64 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 44.
65 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 219.
66 See id. at 228.
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she has the right to refuse him sexually 7 and leave his house
without his permission 68- a right of movement rare for the
Muslim wife.6 9
There are some legal rules that limit the positive economic
effects of dower law for women. If a marriage is not consummat-
ed and the wife is divorced, she receives only half.70  Under
Hanafi law, the Islamic sect the Taliban follow, 71 a wife may
refuse sex with her husband for failure to pay dower, but only if
they have not yet consummated the marriage. 72 Thus, to some
extent, dower is still conditional upon sexual submission.
2.4. Marriage
As is true for inheritance and dower, the Shari'a also has
detailed rules for marriage. The Islamic laws on marriage have
many negative social implications for women. Polygamy
specifically is permissible73 and a husband has unilateral power
to divorce his wife. On the other hand, a wife's ability to divorce
is very limited.74 The main ways, however, in which marriage
laws negatively affect Afghan women's economic positions is
through the doctrines of maintenance and obedience.7
2.4.1. Maintenance
The basic provision for maintenance seems to offer positive
economic implications for women. The right of maintenance
dictates that a man must provide for his wife at his expense.76
All Islamic countries have incorporated this religious law as the
67 See NASDR, supra note 43, at 57.
69 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 184.
69 See infra section 2.2.
70 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 52.
71 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 26.
7 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 57.
71 See id. at 24.
74 See ESPOSrTO, supra note 21, at 29-30. See also Seth Mydans, Blame Men,
Not Allab, Islamic Feminists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1996, at A4 (noting that
in Islamic courts "women generally have fewer rights in questions of divorce").
7- The maintenance laws come from a combination of the Quran, Sunnah,
and consensus, see NASIR, supra note 43, at 60, whereas the obedience law does
not stem from a specific Quranic provision, see ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 23.
76 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 59. See also Othman, supra note 51, at 6
(noting that men have the obligation to financially support family members).
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law of the state.77 Maintenance is a legal entitlement for a wife,
enforceable in court78 and available regardless of her independent
wealth.79 Thus, the basic Islamic rule of maintenance seems to
affect women economically by providing a legal right to economic
resources. The other religious laws applicable to maintenance,
however, reveal that the maintenance obligation is severely
limited, difficult to enforce, and easily terminated.
First, maintenance is not a lump sum of money that women
receive and control. Rather, the main requirement of mainte-
nance is for a husband to provide his wife with food, clothing,
lodging, and medical care.80 Most of maintenance thus does not
give a woman transferrable assets that she can use as an economic
actor in the market.
Second, a woman is entitled to maintenance only upon
meeting certain marriage conditions. She is entitled to mainte-
nance only if a valid marriage contract exists, she "places ...
herself in the husband's power so as to allow him free access to
herself [physically]," and she obeys all his lawful commands.8
The tamkeen, or the physical availability of a wife, rather than the
marriage contract, is the predicate for maintenance.8 2 Thus, to
gain access to these economic resources, a woman must physically
and willingly submit to her husband's orders. 3
Third, under Hanafi law,84 maintenance is difficult to enforce.
' See NASIR, supr a note 43, at 59 (noting that all modern Arab laws have
the basic marital maintenance provision). In particular, Nasir gives a non-
exclusive list of the maintenance provisions in Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait,
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Lebanon. See id.
78 See ESPOSrrO, supra note 21, at 27 ("If the husband refuses to pay mainte-
nance, the wife has the right to sue for it.").
79 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 59-60. Islamic laws do not recognize
marriage as creating communal property; spouses retain ownership of what
they owned before marriage. See EsposiTo, supra note 21, at 24.
so See ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 26; NASIR, supra note 43, at 59-60. "If
the husband provides the wife with sufficient food, clothing and other basic
needs, and a decent home, there shall be no point in the wife requiring any
maintenance from the court." Id. at 66.
81 NASIR, supra note 43, at 60-61.
82 See id. at 62.
83 If a woman works against her husband's will, he can deny her
maintenance. See id. Thus, a woman sometimes gains the economic resources
of maintenance only at the expense of other economic opportunities.
84 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 26 (noting that Afghans generally follow
the Hanafi sect).
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Even if a court finds that a man neglected his maintenance duties,
his wife cannot receive past due maintenance and can only receive
a prospective order of payment."5 Even if a man continuously
refuses to pay maintenance, his wife does not have sufficient
grounds for divorce under Hanafi law. 6 Thus, the law may give
no recourse to a woman facing both denial of access to basic
economic provisions of maintenance and restriction in her ability
to work.17  Therefore, maintenance does little to further a
woman's economic position in Afghanistan.
2.4.2. Obedience: Restrictions on Women's Movement
An Afghan woman's duty to obey her husband is the second
aspect of Islamic marriage law that affects her economic position.
According to the Shari'a, a wife has a general duty of obedience
to her husband. 8 Islamic jurists, in particular, have found that
a woman cannot leave her husband's home without his permis-
sion. 9 If she leaves without her husband's permission, he can
5 See ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 27.
86 See id. In most Muslim states it is very difficult for a woman to obtain
a divorce for any reason. See Diego Ribadeneira, Questions on the Koran,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 15, 1997, at A12.
s7 For example, Farida Ghulam, a member of the Bahrain Young Ladies
Association, noted many cases where the wives were neglected or had no
economic support from their husbands at all. She also noted that the
Bahrainian courts would not force the men to pay, nor allow the women to
divorce. See Women in Bahrain Seek Clear Guidelines on Family Issues as
Defined by Sharia Law, MONEYCLIPS, Sept. 30, 1995.
88 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 39; ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 23.
89 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 39; ESPOSITO, supra note 21, at 23; LAYISH,
supra note 38, at 101. See also Behind the Chador, ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1997 at
S9 (noting that, under Islamic Law, women do not have the same rights to
travel as men). In Saudi Arabia, women are absolutely prohibited from
travelling unless accompanied by a man. See Can Muslim Women Thrive Under
the Veil?, supra note 54.
Jan Goodwin, in her book, Price of Honor, describes how the restrictions
on movement affected one wife of an Egyptian taxi driver. "[The] college
educated wife, Wafa [was] confined to their tiny four room apartment... and
forbidden to leave the house for any reason. She is not even permitted to visit
other women living in their apartment building .... When they were first
married, [the husband] insisted that Wafa discontinue her studies. [The
husband said] 'I want to control [my wife] and my daughter wherever they go
... She has no permission to go anywhere without me ... " JAN
GOODWIN, PRICE OF HONOR: MUSLIM WOMEN LIFT THE VEIL OF SILENCE
ON THE ISLAMIC WORLD (1994) 340-42, quoted in Pamela Goldberg, Seeing
Through Women's Eyes, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 603, 611 (1994).
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have an Islamic court declare her rebellious' ° and lawfully
withdraw all economic support.9'
Similar to the Quranic laws of inheritance, Islamic countries
generally have not hesitated to enforce the duty of obedience as
state law. 2 Syria, Jordan, and Kuwait have even specifically
codified this law of obedience. 3 Whether through codification
or judicial enforcement, the Taliban government is likely to make
obedience part of its general laws.
2.4.3. Employment
The obedience law's limitation on a woman's movement has
significant implications for her ability to seek work outside of
home. Husbands effectively possess the power to prevent their
wives from working. Under the obedience doctrine, if a woman
wants to work and gain access to economic resources, her husband
may turn to the courts for recourse.9 4 He can stop supporting
his wife95 and even physically punish her with little restric-
tion. 6
Using the obedience doctrine to prevent a woman from
working generally is acceptable in the Muslim world. "The
majority of Islamic jurists [from all Islamic sects] rule that there
shall be no maintenance for the wife who goes out to work
without permission of her husband."97 Significantly, Muslim
countries have the lowest female employment rates in non-
agricultural jobs. The Taliban rule, with its fundamentalist
focus, will be no different. The Taliban did not even wait for
I See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 101 (noting that the judgment of
rebelliousness was one of the traditional powers of an Islamic court); Chand,
supra note 91 (noting that Bahrain courts would even encourage husbands to
request an order of obedience).
91 See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 101.
92 See NASiR, supra note 43, at 39-40.
9' See id.
11 See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 101.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 109 ("Wife-beating 'for the purpose of chastisement' ... was
considered legitimate from the shari'a point of view .... ")
97 NASIR, supra note 43, at 62. See also Anil Noel Netto, Malaysia. Women:
Discrimination in the Workplace Still Strong, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 3, 1997
(noting that husbands often are opposed to their wives' desire to work outside
the home).
9' See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 57.
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husbands to stop women from working; they banned women
from employment from the beginning.99 Therefore, the Shari'a
rules on obedience will limit an Afghan woman's ability to be a
free economic actor.
Overall, although some of the marriage laws will limit
economic wealth, Islamic law itself does not dictate the economic
oppression of Afghan women. Rather, the laws of inheritance and
dower could give Afghan women specific rights to economic
resources. An analysis of the economic situation of Afghan
women, however, cannot stop with Islamic law. Studies of other
Islamic countries have shown that social forces that shape the
impact of inheritance, dower, and marriage law will severely limit
the economic freedom of Afghan women. Thus, the Taliban's
promise to impose Islamic law has an ominous impact on women
because the Taliban also bring an oppresssive culture.
3. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
FACTORS
The gap between legally available options and rights and those
that are actually accessible to most women is very large. ' °° As
noted previously, Islam contains many legal rules that are meant
to structure Muslim society generally and define gender roles.
These rules will have a clear impact on Afghan women's econom-
ic position. The laws, however, are not the only economic factor.
This Section analyzes three studies of other Muslim communities
to predict the impact of social forces on Afghan women.
Moreover, this Section shows that cultural norms severely limit
the technical rights to inheritance, dower, and marriage mainte-
nance. Thus, by analyzing the social modification of the three
legal rules, this Section shows how social norms, and not the
technical Islamic law, are the main factors that limit the economic
power of Afghan women. Overall, when the law itself seems to
give women access to property through inheritance and dower,
the social reality nullifies this economic power. In the case of
marriage, social forces enhance the already negative impact of the
laws.
Social norms and customs are particularly relevant for a study
" See Morning Edition: Islamic Group, supra note 7.
100 Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 47.
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of a Muslim society. Custom is a valid, recognized source of
Islamic law.101 This section does not, however, focus on the
customary laws separate from the more definitive laws drawn
from the four chief sources: the Quran, Sunnah, the Ijmaa, and
the Qiyas.1°2 Rather, this Section emphasizes how customs and
social forces affect the three traditional laws discussed previously:
inheritance, dower, and marriage. The information on the impact
of social norms comes mainly from studies of Muslims in Israel,
Egypt, and the West Bank. Clearly, these societies differ from
Afghanistan in many ways.103 Overall, however, these studies
analyze social factors that are common to Muslim societies. In
particular, these factors stem from the implications of maintenance
laws and from the general patriarchal nature of the societies.
Maintenance is a major part of Muslim law 4 and will be part
of Afghanistan's system. Also, the early actions of the Taliban
reveal a strong patriarchal tendency01 Thus, these studies offer
relevant examples sufficiently analogous to predict the future
economic position of Afghan women.
3.1. Inheritance
Inheritance is the area of Quranic law that social norms affect
most. All three countries presented in the following examples
reveal that women's actual access to property through inheritance
encounters severe limits under the common social practice of
women giving their inheritance wealth to their patrilineal families.
101 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 49; Dwyer, sup.ra note 35, at 2-3 (noting
that customary law is recognized by jurists as a subsidiary, yet valid, source of
Muslim law).
102 See HUSSAIN, supra note 36, at 41, 49. These four elements are the main
sources of Muslim law or Shari'a. See id. at 41. Custom is considered a
supplementary source and if the custom is not expressly forbidden by the
Quran, it can be a source of law. See id. at 49.
103 For example, Egypt is influenced by its history of being controlled by
Great Britain. See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 40-42. Women in the
West Bank are influenced by the intifad-a. See MooRs, supra note 45, at 121.
Women in Israel have the unique option of turning to the more liberal secular
courts. See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 288-89.
104 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 59 (noting that all modern Arab laws have
the basic marital maintenance provision).
105 The best example of Taliban's patriarchal tendency is its prompt order
to ban women from most employment. See McGirk, supra note 23, at A10.
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3.1.1. Egypt
In a study of Egyptian women, Audrey Smock and Nadia
Youssef examined how the kinship group limited women's real
access to inheritance wealth. 6  According to Islamic law, a
woman's fathers, uncles, and brothers are economically responsi-
ble for her regardless of her marital status.07 This kinship
responsibility of support is even stronger than the husband's." 8
This kinship obligation affects a woman's marital relations; if a
woman is more able to leave her husband if she can rely on her
patrilineal family's obligation to support her.1 Similarly, this
family maintenance obligation is crucial because of a husband's
almost unlimited right of divorce under Hanafi law.10
Smock and Youssef found, however, that this maintenance
obligation is not a free system of support for women to rely on
as a economic fall-back regardless of their actions. Rather,
patrilineal maintenance was a necessity. A woman had few
options for supporting herself outside of marriage and was
therefore dependent on family maintenance."' To ensure that
her patrilineal family will maintain her after divorce or widow-
hood, a woman would often try to appease her family.112 Thus,
Smock and Youssef found that women frequently gave their
brothers or fathers any inherited wealth to ensure that they would
106 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 35.
107 See id. at 43; CNN News: Divine Guidance (CNN television broadcast,
Dec. 5, 1995) (noting that a woman's parents, under Islamic law, are directed
to support her financially).
o See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 44.
109 See id. at 46 ("The divorced woman invariably returns to her parents'
home."). Smock and Youssef note that it is the kinship duty of support that
women must rely on upon divorce. See id.
The husband has no duty to maintain a divorced wife after the three-
month iddah. See NASIR, supra note 43, at 96; Esposrro, supra note 21, at 26.
11o See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 46 (noting the high frequency
of divorce in Egypt due to the hiusband's broad right to end a marriage. See
also CNN News: Divine Guidance, supra note 108 (noting that under Islam men
can divorce at will); Khaliq, supra note 21, at 33 ("Islam is renowned for
making divorce amazingly simple for men.")
. See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 47. For example, Smock and
Youssef found that women hafffew opportunities to earn a living through
public employment due to sex segregation in the workforce and gener~al societal
disapproval of women working. See id. at 49.
112 See id. at 47.
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maintain the women after divorce or the death of a husband.1 13
The women did not usually own or have economic control over
their inherited wealth. Thus, social reality restricted the actual
property access that was granted by Quranic inheritance law.
This phenomenon of relinquishing inherited wealth to insure
familial maintenance was also prevalent in the Muslim communi-
ties in Israel.
3.1.2. Muslim Communities in Israel
Aharon Layish conducted a study of Muslim women living in
Israel.114  Layish found that these women, as was the case in
Egypt, gave their inherited wealth to the male members of their
patrilineal family."n  Layish described the phenomenon as
occurring frequently, particularly considering that many of these
transfers of inherited wealth were not formalized by court
order.
116
Layish, like Smock and Youssef, also found it was the
women's dependency on family maintenance that spurred this
renunciation of inheritance rights. She found that women
were at risk of losing their family maintenance support if they did
not relinquish their inherited wealth to male family members.
For example,
113 See id. at 47. This study also found the males in a woman's family often
just appropriated her property without sanction on the grounds that they
would have to support their sisters or daughters in the event of divorce. See
id.
114 See LAYISH, supra note 38. Although the state's regular judiciary
governs the Muslim community living in Israel, separate Islamic courts that
apply the Shari'a govern issues of personal status. See id. at 2. "[T]he Muslim
religious commumity enjoyed the widest judicial autonomy of any religious
community in the country." Id. For issues of inheritance Muslim women
could choose to have their cases decided by a secular court under the more
favorable secular laws, but the majority chose the Shari'a courts. See id. at 287-
88.
This study focused on women living in Israel proper and not the disputed
West Bank areas that the Moors study focused on. See id. at xiii; MOORS, supra
note 45, at 19.
115 See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 291.
116 See id.
117 "Muslim women did not as a rule inherit... due.., to the system of
kinship relations in traditional society, which is so vital to the protection and
security of women that they are willing to renounce property rights for its
sake." Id. at 302.
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There was a definite correlation between the extent of the
son's readiness to pay maintenance to their mothers and
the state of property relations after the death of the family
head: where the mother held the family property of her
share in the estate, the sons were less ready to grant her
economic assistance.
118
Layish also found many cases in which although a court
registered a woman's inheritance to her, her brothers eventually
received the wealth through sales without consideration."9
Familial pressure was often the driving force behind these
transfers.2 Thus, the Muslim women in Israel are another
example of how women's economic rights under the Quran are
limited by social forces. This was also true for the Palestinian
women living in the occupied West Bank territory.
3.1.3. Palestinian Women in the West Bank
In 1995, Annelies Moors published a study of Palestinian
women living in the Jabal Nablus region of the West Bank.'2'
This study adds further detail on how family maintenance limits
women's access to inheritance. Like Smock and Youssef, as well
as Layish, Moors found that Muslim women let their patrilineal
family take ownership of their inheritance share to ensure that the
family would maintain them financially.' 2 Moors also found
m Id. at 105.
19 See id. at 301.
120 See id. at 302. Layish was told of several cases where the woman had
her ownership of inherited property formalized by a court, but later transferred
it to her male family without consideration because "they were no longer able
to withstand family sanctions." Id.
.21 See MOORS, supra note 45. This study differs from Layish's study,
which focused on Muslim women living in the undisputed areas of Israel
proper. See id. at 19; LAYISH, supra note 38, at xiii. The two areas obviously
have different political and economic realities. See MOORS, supra note 45, at 17-
21. The Shari'a court system and Islamic personal status law, however, still
govern Muslims in the occupied territory. See id. at 19. Thus, this study offers
another example, with a different population, of the real effects of the Shari'a.
"[F]ew daughters with brothers would ever take their [inheritance] share
.... " MOORS, supra note 45, at 53. "[B]y leaving her share to her brothers,
a daughter reaffirms and strengthens her ties with her closest male kinsmen."
Id. at 54.
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that most women depended on this familial maintenance.1"
Moors' study revealed what would happen to these women if
they did claim their inheritance share. "MIlf a woman demands her
share,.., her kinship ties with her brothers are usually disrupted
at once and she is no longer able to invoke their help and
support."' 24 Taking her inheritance, and thus weakening her
familial ties, also weakened a woman's position against her
husband. 12 Moors found that the inheritance a woman might
gain did not generally offset the economic loss of lost familial
maintenance.
12 6
Moors also found that even if a woman did not have brothers
(the relatives most likely to get her inheritance share), she still
often did not get her inherited wealth.' 27 Those with control of
her share often ignored her claim and her actual ability to receive
it depended on the position of her husband.128 If her patrilineal
family could not stop the woman from taking her share, they
would often, as her guardian 129 (and if she were single), marry
her to a cousin to keep the land in the family. 3 Thus, overall,
the Palestinian women of the West Bank are another example of
how the need for familial maintenance led to women renouncing
their inheritance rights. All three example communities showed
that although the technical law of the Quaran allows women to
inherit wealth, social factors limit these rights.
3.2. Dower
As was the case with inheritance, social forces limit a
woman's actual access to property granted to her under Quranic
123 See id. at 54.
124 Id. at 55.
125 See id.
126 See id. (noting that because of gender-specific agricultural tasks, women
property owners needed men to make their land productive). Women who lost
their male family members' support could not get their brothers to work for
them and therefore lacked suffi6ent labor to put the land to use. See id.
127 See id. at 58.
128 See id.
129 Guardianship is the rule, recognized by most Islamic jurists, which states
a "woman shall not conduct her own marriage contract.., even when she
possesses full legal capacity.. . ." NAsiR, supra note 43, at 9. Guardianship is
traditionally practiced in Afghanistan. See Angela Neustatter, Homeife Love in
the Time of the Taliban, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Dec. 28, 1996, at 16.
13' See MOORS, supra note 45, at 58-59.
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dower law. In particular, the common Muslim practice of a male
guardian controlling the marriage of a woman' often led to the
guardian taking ownership of her dower. Also, the husband could
often control his wife's dower because of her economic depen-
dence on him. These two social forces limited women's property
rights in all three example communities: Egypt, Israel, and the
West Bank area.
3.2.1. Egypt
Smock and Youssef found that the dower often came to be
owned by the wife's patrilineal family.1 2  This was usually
caused by the family's control over whom the daughter mar-
ried. 33 This study also found that a woman would forego a
portion of her dower that would be payable upon divorce in
order to free herself from a bad marriage. M Layish's study of
Muslim women living in Israel support these findings.
3.2.2. Israel
Layish found that it was fairly common in Israel's Muslim
communities for a wife's family to take ownership of her dower
property. "[A] woman was generally given in marriage by a
marriage guardian, who might be her father or brother or another
131 See id.
132 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 47.
133 See id. True stories of Muslim women reveal that a woman's father can
exert strong control over her marriage. Not surprisingly, the father often gets
control of the dower. In 1996, a 21-year old Pakistani woman named Saima
Waheed married the man of her choice. Her father objected because he did not
choose the husband. Consequently, he petitioned the Pakistan Lahore High
Court to annul the marriage. See Saeed Shah, Pakistani Woman Fights to Keep
Husband, REuTERs WORLD SERVICE, Ma 20, 1996. Saima received so much
pressure at home to annul the marriage that she fled to a shelter for women.
Her father then filed a petition of habeas corpus for her removal from the
shelter. See id. The father argued that "a woman may not marry without her
father's consent ... ." Saima stated, "'[w]hat I have seen done to the women
in my family, I did not want to happen to me.... I'm afraid for my life...
I have been threatened by my family continuously since I ran away.'" Id.
Iran offers another example of the control a father can exert over his
daughter's marriage. "In 1995, an 18-year-old Iranian girl was blinded, on a
court's orders, for marrying without her father's consent." Mary Bryant,
Danger of Tunnel Vision from Behind the Veil, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON),
Jan. 18, 1997, at 2.
134 See Bryant, supra note 133.
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relative, and who received the dower on her behalf."3 ' Shari'a
court cases involving matrimonial disputes, often revealed that the
dower had been given to the woman's family and not to her.'36
Layish also found "express evidence of husbands taking control of
their wives' dower without their consent." 137  Thus, in the
Muslim communities of Israel, the custom of guardianship and a
husband's power limited women's legal/Quranic right to dower.
3.2.3. West Bank
Moors's study of the West Bank Muslim community found the
clearest evidence of the dower right being limited by social and
customary forces. First, Moors, like Smock/Youssef and Layish,
found that a wife's father often kept part of the dower.138
Second, Moors found that the stronger force behind the decline of
dower property was the societal shift from extended family
networks to a more nuclear family.'39 These social factors,
combined with a more industrialized economy, made women
more economically dependent on their husbands."' This new
marital dependence made women more willing to relinquish
dower.
For example, the women would generally not sue for their
dower unless their husband left them with no economic support
at all. 141 Even though the wives did not receive their legal right
to dower, they would not sue a husband who was generally
maintaining her because that maintenance was too economically
important to put at risk." When the women did sue for their
dower, it was, in virtually all these claims, combined with a suit
135 LAYISH, supra note 38, at 48.
136 See id. at 49. "In several cases, a woman alleged that she had not
received the whole or part of the dower, and afterward it appeared that her
father had received it without her knowledge." Id.
137 Id.
138 See MOORS, supra note 45, at 102.
139 See id. at 125 (noting that women's economic power is declining becuase
men are taking over wage labor positions previously held by women).
Additionally, a decrease in dowers and a new emphasis on marital relations
have made women increasingly dependent upon their husbands. See id.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 102.
142 See id.
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for marital maintenance.143 The women would then drop the
dower claim once the husband agreed to the maintenance
claim. 1
44
Thus, these women gave up their dower rights to strengthen
their position in their marriages, particularly to protect their
maintenance. Moors also found that women would relinquish
their dower rights at divorce.'45 Dower usually is given in two
forms, prompt dower and deferred dower.'" Prompt dower is
due at marriage, and deferred dower usually becomes due at
divorce or the death of the husband. 47 Although the desire to
strengthen the marriage leads to women relinquishing the prompt
dower, other social forces lead to relinquishing the deferred
dower.
Many widows refrain from claiming their dower at the death
of their husbands so that their sons might inherit more.4 This
is probably to strengthen the son's obligation to maintain his
mother; the same reason women relinquish their inheritance share
generally. Also, women eager to get out of a bad marriage and
faced with limited legal divorce options often go through the khul
divorce. 49  This divorce is easier; it requires no litigation and
the husband will be more willing to let the wife go because he
receives monetary consideration for the loss of his wife.i s This
consideration usually consists of the wife's renunciation of her
deferred dower.' Finally, even if the husband initiates the
divorce, a woman often does not get her deferred dower because
she must go through time-consuming and often costly litigation
to get it.'5 ' Thus, social forces also limit women's access to
deferred dower. Therefore, the lives of women on the West Bank
exemplify how social forces can limit women's real access to their
legal right to dower.
143 See id.
144 See id. (noting that the main intent of these cases was to obtain the
crucial marital maintenance).
14S See id. at 147.
146 See NASIR, supra note 43, at 45-46.
147 See id. at 46.
148 See MOORS, supra note 45, at 147.
149 See id. at 142.
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 See id.
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3.2.4. Positive Findings
The studies of dower are not universally disheartening. In
particular, Layish found that some Muslim women living in Israel
proper did receive their legal dower entitlement. Despite the
various social limitations in this community, Layish found much
evidence that some women received full ownership of their
dower.13 Widows and spinsters who did not have a guardian
controlling their marriages (and thereby receiving the dower) got
their dowers1 4 Also, Layish found many cases where urban
women would sue in court or leave their husband's home to get
their dower; though this was much less common for rural
women. 5 Finally, Layish noted that when the women did sue
for their dowers the Shari'a courts decided in favor of the woman
in most cases.5 6 Therefore, overall, dower is limited by some
social forces, but this limitation does not undermine the legal
right as extensively as the social limitations on inheritance.
3.3. Marriage and Work
As noted previously, the obedience law of marriage severely
hinders a woman's ability to work outside of the home. Just as
social forces limited the legal rights of inheritance and dower,
social forces worsen the already extensive limitations on women's
ability to work. The connection between women's status in
society and their perceived chastity is the main social norm that
limits their employment options.
3.3.1. Egypt
Smock and Youssef offer the strongest evidence of how status
and chastity norms function in Muslim society. Their study
pointed to two major social forces that oppress women economi-
cally: kinship ties5 7 and the power of honor.'58  This honor,
10 See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 49.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 49-50.
16 See id. at 60 (noting that these courts resisted customary practices that
took control of the dower out of women's hands).
17 The power of kinship ties to limit women economically was discussed
in the section on inheritance. See supra section 3.1.
158 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 43.
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and the social status that comes with honor is largely based on a
woman's chaste behavior.159  Thus, "any suspicion or mistrust
of [the woman's] moral conduct can stigmatize her and her family
for life. " 10 For women, "[a]ctivities involving the public are.
easily linked with suspicions of promiscuous behavior .... 16i
Therefore, a woman's status in society is put at risk by her
employment, which places her in continuous contact with public
life.
162
This loss of status by working can, for women, have very
harmful effects. For example, a woman who works or has
worked has a much harder time marrying (a crucial way to find
economic support in Muslim society).1 63 Thus, Smock and
Youssef found that women's status was based on how much they
met the societal expectations of chaste, reclusive behavior.' 64
They found that the status costs of working outweigh the benefits.
This balance of utilities causes the low percentage of female
workers in Muslim communities.165  Therefore, the social force
for chaste behavior further limits women's ability to gain
economic resources through work.
3.3.2. Israel
Layish did not extensively study the social forces acting on
Muslim women's ability to work. 166 However, she did cite one
' See id. The honor of men is based on the chastity of their female family
members. See id. Women's honor and status is based on their own perceived
chastity. See id. at 44; see also Bryant, supra note 133, at 2 (noting that male
honor rests on female behavior).
16 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 44. Women often face physical
injury for "unchaste" behavior. This violence is sometimes sanctioned by
Islamic law. For example, the Jordanian Penal Code exempts a man from any
penalty if he wounds or even kills his wife or daughter because they committed
adultery. See Nicholas Kochin, Bound by Faith and Statute, FIN. TIMES, July 20,
1996, at 13.
16 See Smock & Youssef, supra note 38, at 45.
162 See id.
163 See id. at 44.
164 See id. at 48.
165 See id. at 49 ("The conspicuous absence of married women from the
occupational world.., could very well be caused, in part, by [women's] own
assessment of the gains and losses involved.")
'66 She did find some evidence that it was easier for Muslim women to
work in more modernized urban areas. See LAYISH, supra note 38, at 7.
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study of Muslim communities in Israel that found the severe
restrictions of traditional society limited women's ability to
work. 167
3.3.3. West Bank
Moors' study supports Smock and Youssef's findings. Moors
found that in Muslim communities, working women are very
controversial, particularly if they leave the West Bank and go into
Israel to work.168 The social norm viewed working women as
putting themselves in great "moral danger."1 69 Thus, as was the
case in Israel, a working woman risked her status as a chaste
female by going out to work.1 70
Moors did find that some women worked outside of the
home. These women, however, do not undermine the basic
premise that most women do not work because of social stigma.
These women only worked because of dire financial need. The
economic situation was so bad that it outweighed even the strict
social punishments for working.17 ' The behavior is in accord
with the view of many Islamic jurists, who hold that women may
work only in cases of necessity.172
Even for these working women, earned income did not always
bring economic power. Fathers often prevented their working
daughters from marrying because the family depended on her
wages. 3 Also, widows were known to give a portion of their
wages to their sons. 4 Overall, women in the West Bank did
not work because working brought suspicions of promiscuity.
The only exception were very poor women in dire financial need.
Therefore, this community, as well as the Egyptian community,
reveals how social norms worsen the already extensive limitations
on women's employment.
167 See id. (citing A. COHEN, ARAB BORDER VILLAGES IN ISRAEL: A STUDY
OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE N SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (1965)).
161 See MOORS, supra note 45, at 182.
169 Id. at 184. This moralistic view of working women "ties in with the
cultural emphasis on the need to curtail women's freedom of movement to
avoid [sexual] relations, which were seen as undermining the social order." Id.
170 See id.
171 See id. at 185, 186.
172 See Khaliq, supra note 21, at 25-26.
173 See MOORS, supra note 45, at 188.
174 See id.
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3.4. Social Forces in Afghanistan
Studies of Muslim communities show that social forces limit
women's legal rights to inheritance and dower, and can effectively
prevent their employment. The Taliban government has forcibly
imposed these social norms on the part of Afghanistan they
control. 75 The Taliban originate from the historically rural and
conservative Kandahar area 6 from which they bring the patriar-
chal culture which is the main culprit in surpressing Muslim
women's economic opportunities."77
Specifically, in accordance with the government's promise to
impose Islamic law,178 the Taliban will incorporate the tradition-
al familial maintenance provisions of the Shari'a. Thus, Taliban
Afghan society will possess the factor that has been found to limit
women's real control over inheritance.17 9  The Taliban govern-
ment is also, as part of imposing the Shari'a, likely to incorporate
both marriage guardianship and the provisions giving husbands
broad divorce and maintenance power. The region will therefore
175 See, e.g., Christopher Thomas, Militants Bring a Veil Down on Battered
Kabul, TIMES (London), Sept. 30, 1996, at 11 (noting that women were beaten
by the militia for wearing "un-Islamic" dress and have been banned from
working); John F. Burns, New Afghan Rulers Impose Harsh Mores of the Islamic
Code, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 1996, at Al (same).
The Taliban have established a religious police, the Office for the
Propagation of Virtue and the Prohibition of Vice, who were involved in the
stoning to death of a couple who had committed adultery. See John F. Burns,
Stoning of Afghan Adulterers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996, at 18.
176 See Burns, supra note 8, at A10.
1 The Taliban have closed all of the schools for girls while leaving the
schools for boys open. See 60 Minutes: Taliban, supra note 7. The Taliban's
Deputy Foreign Minister, when asked what women should do instead of
working, replied, "sewing and knitting." Id. He went on to comment, "[t]hey
should be sitting in their home[s]." !d.
Sima Wali of the Afghan Women's Network stated, "[t]his is the darkest
moment in Afghan history for women and girls. The Taliban version of Islam
is male-defined[and] extremist." CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast,
Oct. 10, 1996).
17 The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Taliban government, Sher
Mohammed Stanakzai, has stated, "Afghanistan is an Islamic state, and our rules
and regulations will be ... Islamic rules. Whatever is in Islam ... will be
implemented [by the Taliban]. We will be strict with that." 60 Minutes:
Taliban, supra note 7.
179 See supra Section 3.1.
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possess the factors that limit women's real access to dower.'
Finally, the Taliban government has made its disapproval of
working women very clear. One of its first acts was to ban
women from all employment."' 1 In Afghanistan, the customary
and social norms that limit women's employment opportunities
have the extra force of the government's coercive power. 182
Thus, the Taliban state possesses these social and customary forces
that will severely limit the economic prospects of Afghan women.
4. A METHODOLOGY FOR REFORM
The new Taliban rule presents a bleak economic future for
Afghan women. To improve this situation, however, women's
rights advocates must go beyond the typical method of blaming
Islam itself.183  The Taliban's main philosophy is Islamic
rule.'84 This philosophy was also the unifying force in the
rebellion against the Soviets.8 5 Therefore, to be successful, any
reform must come from within the bounds of Islam. "[R]eforms
must be rooted in a consistent Islamic rationale." ' The best
prospects for reform stem from the fact that Islam does possess a
methodology for change that can improve the economic situation
of women.
4.1. Ijtihad: Islamic Methodology for Reform
The early development of Islamic jurisprudence was at first
liberal, allowing for growth and change. Until about the tenth
century the doctrine of ijtihad, or individual reasoning, was
accepted.8 ' This doctrine allows an individual to make his or
her own interpretation of Islamic doctrine.' 8 If this interpreta-
tion becomes accepted by other jurists, it can become valid
180 See supra Section 3.2.
... See CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 10, 1996).
' See supra Section 3.4.
183 See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 11, at 312.
184 See 60 Minutes: Taliban, supra note 7.
18. See John-Thor Dahlburg, Cold War Incursion Sowed Seeds of Terror, L.A.
TIMEs, Aug. 4, 1996, at Al.
186 ESPOSrTO, supra note 21, at 102.
187 See id. at 103-104.
118 See id. at 103.
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law.l"9  Two forces, however, closed this dynamic force of
ijtihad.
First, customary practice of Arabia erroneously became
equated with the practice of the Prophet and was thereby given
an unwarranted sacrosanct character.' 9° Second, the doctrine of
taqlid, or imitation of early Muslim communities, was developed.
In the tenth century it was decided that Islam was fully developed
and no further change was necessary. Islam was no longer open
to interpretation and the early customs were meant for imitation.
The doctrine of ijtihad was rejected in favor of taqlid; "[t]he doors
of ijtihad were closed."19' The job of the Muslim jurist was now
limited to finding how Muslim society was structured in ancient
times.'92 This began an "era of sterility" in Islam that continues
to the present day.'93 Muslim reformers as early as the twelfth
century argued against the taqlid and in favor of reviving the
ijtihad." 4
Modern Muslim feminists embrace this idea of reviving ijtihad
as a methodology of reform. 95 First, they note that the Prophe-
t's original message was very liberating for women.' In partic-
ular, Mohammed specifically changed some of the worst anti-
woman practices of the very patriarchal tribal society.9 7 For
example, he ended the practice of selling wives with his dower
rules, imposed the rule of women's consent to marriage, and made
significant strides in ending the very entrenched practice of
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 Id. at 104.
192 See id.
193 See id. (quoting SUBI MAHMASANI, FAJSAFAT AL-TASHRI FI AL-ISLAM
39 (Farhat J. Ziadeh trans., EJ. Brill 1961)).
194 See id.
1 See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 11. Zuleikha Abu Risha, a founding
member of the Islamic Women's Society, has stated that, "'it is also time that
educated women read the Koran for themselves and make their own interpreta-
tions of it.'" Pamela Goldberg, Seeing Through Women's Eyes, 11 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 603, 612 (1994) citation omitted).
196 Jan Goodwin, in her book PRICE OF HONOR: MUSLIM WOMEN LIFT
THE VEIL OF SILENCE ON THE ISLAMIC WORLD, argues that "Islam... is, at
root, protective of women's rights and inherently pro-woman." Goldberg,
supra note 199, at 612.
197 See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 11, at 324-30.
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polygamy.198 Mohammed even "designated his wife A'isha a
religious authority[,] stating, 'take half of your religion from this
ruddy-complexioned woman."'199
Second, Muslim feminists argue that Mohammed not only
provided as much change for women as the times would allow,
but also left the seeds for further change.200 Thus, they embrace
the revival of a new interpretation, ijtihad, a message that should
be heard by those who desire reform in Afghanistan. As stated by
Leila Sayeh and Adriaen Morse in their argument for a ijtihad
reform methodology:
[w]omen have fundamental freedoms within Islam, and all
the goals of equality espoused by the West can be achieved
by applying the notion of gradualism inherent in the
religion. Thus, the best way to solve this problem may
not lie in dictating from the outside what standards must
be met by the culture, but rather in encouraging a liberal-
ization of the interpretation of the religion by Islamic
scholars themselves.20 1
4.2. Prospects for Reform in Afghanistan
The seeds for reform do exist in Afghanistan. Women were
somewhat free under the previous rule, with many of them
becoming teachers, nurses, and doctors. 202  Afghan women do
not accept the Taliban without criticism. In the Afghan city of
Herat, women publicly protested the Taliban's severe mea-
sures.2 3 As one Afghan woman stated, "I have taken up this
struggle [to fight the extremists] not just because I am a woman,
but because this is an injustice in the name of my religion. And
198 See id.
199 Id. at 322.
200 Sayeh and Morse describe this as the methodology of "gradualism,"
which they argue is inherent in Islam. See id. at 320-21.
201 Id. at 331-32.
202 See 60 Minutes: Taliban, supra note 7.
203 See 20 Women Arrested in Taliban-held A han City, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Dec. 24, 1996; BBC Summary of Word Broadcasts: Former President
Praises Anti-Taleban Demonstrations in Herat, (BBC radio broadcast, Jan. 4,
1997).
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this misuse of Islam is a major factor in making my religion
completely misunderstood by the West . ... "204 Thus, Muslim
Afghan women use their own interpretation of Islam to argue
against and criticize the policies of the Taliban.20
In addition, Afghanistan's influential neighbor, Pakistan,' 6
has itself embraced the ideology of reform for women.'0 In
particular, Pakistani courts have successfully revived the ijti-
had.2 8 Thus, Pakistan's courts do not feel constrained by the
doctrine of taqlid which limits the ability to change the status of
women. Pakistani courts exercise ijtihad to meet social needs.2 9
Thus, the best prospects for reform of the Taliban come from
Pakistan's possible influence21" and the hope of the further
revival of ijtihad in Islam.
5. CONCLUSION
This Comment establishes that social forces, and not Islamic
law, are the main factors that will cause the economic oppression
of Afghan women. Section 1 shows that the economic position
of Afghan women is of more than academic concern; it is relevant
to many international issues. Section 2 establishes the first tenet
of the argument: Islamic law does not, overall, dictate a subordi-
nate economic position for women. Rather, the technical Islamic
204 Goldberg, supra note 195, at 620 (citation omitted).
205 See id. When Afghan women also protested the Taliban's policies in
Mazar-i-Sharif, one demonstrator stated that "Taleban views on women have
no authority in the Koran." Michael Dynes, Women Use Make-up in Fight
Against Taleban Code, TRMES (London), Oct. 24, 1996.
206 Pakistan is more than just a neighbor to the Taliban. It supported this
faction financially during the Afghan conflict, see Dahlburg, supra note 188, at
Al, and was one of the irst countries to welcome their rule, see Bhutto Hopes
Taliban Will Safeguard Women's Rights, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 4, 1996.
See also BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Pakistan Gives Cash, Machinery For
Central Asia Road Link (BBC radio broadcast, Dec. 20, 1996) (notingthat
Pakistan is giving Afghanistan money to rebuild some of its roads). Thus,
Pakistan might be able to exert influence on the Taliban.
207 See generally ESPOSUTO, supra note 21, at 72-91 (detailing the history of
reform in Pakistai).
208 See id. at 98-99. Pakistan has instituted a number of reforms for
women, such as restricting child marriage. Women also have greater freedom
to divorce because of laws allowing divorce for non-payment of maintenance
and laws making dower rights more enforceable. See id. at 72-91.
209 See id. at 99.
210 See id.
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laws on inheritance and dower give women rights to economic
resources. Section 3, by analyzing studies of other Muslim
communities, establishes the second tenet of the argument: social
forces are the real culprits behind the economic oppression of
Muslim women, and Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, will possess
these limiting social forces. Thus, it is possible to predict that the
cultural norms in Afghanistan will be the real cause of Afghan
women's subordinate economic position. Finally, Section 4 shows
that any improvement in the economic position of women in
Afghanistan must come from a reinterpretation of Islamic law and
not a rejection of Islam itself.
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